Release date
30 October 2026
Author
By Nikolas Charalambous, Managing Director, KENDRIS Capital Limited
Category
Articles
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Who will buy all the bonds?

Who will buy all the bonds?

For much of the period following the global financial crisis, sovereign debt markets operated under conditions that, viewed historically, were extraordinary. Interest rates remained exceptionally low, central banks accumulated government securities through successive quantitative easing programmes, and institutional investors provided steady structural demand for fixed income. Governments grew accustomed to financing themselves in an environment where large borrowing requirements did not necessarily translate into prohibitive debt-servicing costs.

That environment has changed, yet governments' financing needs have moved in the opposite direction. This raises one of the most consequential questions facing global capital markets: who will buy all the bonds?

The scale of the challenge

According to the OECD's Global Debt Report 2026, gross borrowing by OECD governments reached a record $17 trillion in 2025 and is projected to rise to around $18 trillion in 2026. Outstanding sovereign bond debt in OECD countries reached an all-time high of about $61 trillion, and almost 80% of last year's borrowing was refinancing rather than new financing.

That distinction matters. Governments are not only raising capital for new spending; they must continually roll over debt accumulated when financing conditions were far more favourable. As low-cost securities mature and are replaced with prevailing yields, higher interest rates gradually migrate from financial markets into government budgets.
Issuers are already adapting. The OECD notes that governments and companies have been leaning more on shorter maturity debt to limit their exposure to higher long-term rates. That eases the immediate cost, but it shifts more of the burden onto money market investors and means debt must be refinanced more often. In effect, issuers are trading today's price for tomorrow's rollover risk.

A changed market

Recent market moves show how far the financing environment has shifted. On 1 October 2026, the US 10-year Treasury yield touched 5.34% intraday, its highest level since 2002, while the UK 30-year gilt yield rose above 6% for the first time since 1998. A few weeks earlier, the UK Debt Management Office sold 30-year gilts at 5.82%, the highest rate on any gilt issuance since the office was created in 1998. Japan's 10-year yield has climbed to around 3.1%, a level last seen in 1996, and French long-term yields are at their highest since the late 2000s.

It would be simplistic to attribute these moves solely to government borrowing; inflation expectations, monetary policy, energy prices and geopolitics all influence long-term rates. Even so, the growing supply of sovereign debt is increasingly part of the calculation investors make when deciding what yield, they require to commit capital for ten, twenty or thirty years.

The buyers are changing

An equally important change is happening on the demand side. During the QE era, central banks were unusually large buyers of sovereign debt, removing substantial quantities of duration from private markets. The BIS Annual Economic Report 2026 shows that in advanced economies, domestic central banks' share of government bond holdings fell from 27% to 17% as quantitative tightening progressed over 2022–25, while the foreign official sector's share fell from 15% to 13%. Over the same period, non-bank financial institutions increased their share from 44% to 53%.

Sovereign debt has not lost its buyers, but the composition of those buyers has changed. The OECD finds that more price-sensitive investors now hold most domestic government bonds. Ever more issuances must be absorbed by investors whose decisions are driven by relative value, liability requirements and expected returns rather than monetary policy objectives.

Who those investors are also matters. Part of the non-bank share sits with long-term holders such as pension funds and insurers. Part sits with leveraged strategies, such as hedge funds running relative value trades that depend on short-term funding. The BIS warns that this creates a new link between fiscal and financial stability, one in which stress can spread faster and more widely than before. The UK's 2022 LDI episode was an early preview of how quickly part of the buyer base can turn into a source of forced selling.

Price, not availability
There is little evidence that developed market governments are approaching a world in which nobody will buy their securities. The OECD observes that record issuance has continued to be absorbed and that government bond markets have generally remained functional.

The more relevant question is whether investors will keep absorbing ever larger quantities at yields governments consider comfortable. A bond will usually find a buyer if its price adjusts far enough.

Competition for capital

That competition is intensifying. Governments face large spending needs linked to ageing populations, infrastructure renewal, energy security and more resilient supply chains. In Europe, defense has become an additional structural requirement. Presenting its November 2025 Financial Stability Review, the ECB warned that higher defense spending and rising funding costs could further strain sovereigns with structurally high debt. These pressures reflect long-term changes in Europe's security and economic architecture, not temporary fiscal measures.
At the same time, governments are competing with a private sector entering an unusually capital-intensive investment cycle. Artificial intelligence is usually discussed as a technology story, but it is increasingly a financing story too. Data centres, semiconductor capacity, power generation and transmission networks all require enormous investment. According to LSEG data, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Oracle had issued nearly $223 billion of bonds by late August 2026, more than double their total for all of 2025.

Sovereign borrowing, defence, infrastructure and the AI build-out are not separate stories. They are competing claims on the same global pool of savings.

The investor's side of the trade

For institutional investors, this shift has another side. Higher yields are a challenge for borrowers precisely because they are an opportunity for lenders.

For much of the post-crisis period, investors seeking acceptable returns were pushed further along the risk spectrum as government bonds offered little income, fueling allocations to equities, private credit, real assets and alternatives. At today's yields, fixed income once again offers meaningful nominal income and can play a more substantial role in strategic asset allocation. The question shifts from whether bonds offer enough return at all to which issuers, maturity and credit risks provide adequate compensation.

That differentiation matters. The BIS has highlighted the risk of fiscal repricing, where concerns about debt sustainability led investors to demand extra compensation for holding government debt. Because sovereign yields serve as reference rates across financial markets, higher government borrowing costs do not stay inside finance ministries. They feed into corporate financing, mortgages, asset valuations and ultimately economic activity. Fiscal credibility can become a market variable long before any question of solvency arises.

At what price?

Pension funds, insurers, banks, asset managers, households, foreign institutions and a growing range of non-bank intermediaries will continue to provide substantial demand for sovereign debt. Global capital has not disappeared, and government bonds remain central to institutional portfolios.

What has changed is the environment in which that capital is allocated. Governments used to exceptionally cheap financing must now compete for investors alongside corporations funding vast technology and infrastructure programmes, without the structural demand central banks provided during the QE era. The BIS expects central banks may need to intervene more often to address market dysfunction, but that is a backstop, not a source of cheap financing. Investors, meanwhile, once again have a meaningful alternative to taking ever more risk in pursuit of income.

There will almost certainly be buyers. The question that matters is: at what price?

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